為增強(qiáng)校內(nèi)的學(xué)術(shù)氛圍，增進(jìn)研究人員的學(xué)術(shù)交流，提升研究人員的科研水平及論文寫(xiě)作水平，提高論文的發(fā)表率，光學(xué)影響分析與學(xué)習(xí)中心邀請(qǐng)國(guó)際知名復(fù)雜網(wǎng)絡(luò)和大數(shù)據(jù)專(zhuān)家、北海道大學(xué)Marko Jusup博士舉辦專(zhuān)題講座。歡迎廣大科研工作者及研究生踴躍參加：
報(bào) 告 人：Marko Jusup博士，日本北海道大學(xué)助理教授
報(bào)告題目：Cooperation in Social Dilemma Experiments
時(shí) 間：2016年3月25日 上午9:50
地 點(diǎn): 毅字樓6樓西側(cè)光學(xué)影像中心會(huì)議室606室
內(nèi) 容：
One of the most elusive scientific challenges for over 150 years has been to explain why cooperation survives despite being a seemingly inferior strategy from an evolutionary point of view. Over the years, various theoretical scenarios aimed at solving the evolutionary puzzle of cooperation have been proposed, eventually identifying several cooperation-promoting mechanisms: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. We report the results of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments with anonymous and onymous pairwise interactions among individuals. We find that onymity significantly increases the frequency of cooperation and the median payoff per round relative to anonymity. Furthermore, we also show that the correlation between players’ ranks and the usage of strategies (cooperation, defection, or punishment) underwent a fundamental shift, whereby more prosocial actions are rewarded with a better ranking under onymity. Our findings prove that reducing anonymity is a valid promoter of cooperation, leading to higher payoffs for cooperators and thus suppressing an incentive—anonymity—that would ultimately favor defection.
